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Fertility change in Egypt: From second to third birth  
Daniele Vignoli 1 
Abstract 
This work focuses on Egypt, a country that notwithstanding its advanced stage of socio-
demographic transition has shown near stagnation in the reduction of fertility levels in 
the last decade. The progression from second to third birth is a crucial component in 
fertility change, since the reduction especially of third and higher-order births maintains 
the fertility decline. For this reason, the study aims at analyzing the main determinants 
of the third-birth intensities of Egyptian two-child mothers, applying an event-history 
analysis to the 2000 Egyptian Demographic and Health Survey. The study’s results 
show that fertility differentials among the country’s social groups continue to persist. 
Moreover, the difficult change in the fertility of women with high educational standards 
seems to be responsible for the stalling fertility decline during recent years. The 
analysis, however, has demonstrated that within the framework of the ongoing process 
of modernization in the country, even the most laggard groups of women showed a 
decrease in third-birth intensity during the 1990s. The study also reveals that the 
preference for at least one son in the family on the progression to the third child is 
weakening among women who have completed secondary education.  
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1. Introduction  
The fertility patterns of the South-East Mediterranean shore are very different from 
those of the lowest-low fertility countries of the Northern shore (Courbage 1994, 1999, 
2001; Mencarini and Salvini 2003). Recently, however, we are facing a decline in 
fertility levels in all countries of the former region (Figure 1).  
Is the image we have of this area (apart from Turkey) as a bastion of family 
conservatism and as a region of high fertility still applicable today? After all, in some 
countries of the Southern shore of Mediterranean region, women with a high level of 
education who live in an urban area have a period TFR below the replacement level. 
Are these groups of educated and urbanized women forerunners of a wide and 
generalized spread of fertility decline or do they merely represent a plurality of 
behaviors in increasingly heterogeneous societies on the balance between tradition and 
modernization?  
The paper focuses on Egypt, a country that is nowadays characterized by a decline 
in fertility levels and by important changes in the intermediate determinants of fertility, 
especially in urban areas (Giusti and Vignoli 2005, 2006).  
If the first phase of the fertility transition has been generally marked by an increase 
in the age at marriage, in the long run the diffusion of the smaller family will play a 
major role in countries of advanced transition (Salvini 1997), such as Egypt. The 
progression from second to third birth, thus, is a crucial component in fertility change, 
since the reduction especially of third and higher-order births maintains the fertility 
decline (Feeney and Wang 1993). For this reason, the study aims at analyzing the main 
determinants of the third-birth intensities of Egyptian two-child mothers, applying an 
event-history analysis to the 2000 Egyptian Demographic and Health Survey (EDHS 
2000)2. 
Section 2 briefly provides a description of the fertility decline in Egypt. In the next 
section, the paper’s research hypotheses and some descriptive results on the progression 
to third birth are presented. There follows in Section 4 a description of the data and 
methods used. The results are presented in Section 5. The final section summarizes and 
concludes the paper. 
 
                                                        
2
 The most recent retrospective survey was conducted in Egypt in 2005 and the preliminary results just 
appeared - see http://www.measuredhs.com. 
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Figure 1: Fertility trends in the Mediterranean area: a comparison between  
 the northern and southern shores, TFRs.  
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Source: Update on  Mencarini & Salvini, 2003. 
 
 
 
2. Fertility decline in Egypt  
The estimated population of Egypt totals around 69.9 million inhabitants (CAPMAS 
2005). The country is characterized by the presence of large families, by a population 
where more than half have no or little education (more than 60% of the women), and by 
an annual income per capita equal to as little as 1,200$ (ICE, 2005).  
The sustained fertility decline in Egypt began in the 1960s; nevertheless, in 2005 
the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) was still higher than three births per woman (Figure 1). 
This is roughly half a birth above the current fertility level in Algeria and Morocco, and 
almost one birth above the level currently witnessed in Iran and Turkey. According to 
the Demographic and Health Surveys 1995-2003, the average number of children 
desired per woman (Wanted TFR) ranged between 2.5 and 3.0, with the most recent 
estimate at 2.6. 
The fertility level of the most recent decades has been decreasing from a TFR of 
5.3 in 1980 to a TFR of 3.1 in 2005 (El-Zanaty and Way 2006). The fertility decline 
was particularly rapid in the 1980s; thus the drop in fertility was uneven throughout the 
last decade. Moreover, the fall in fertility did not affect all cohorts of fertile women to 
the same degree: While for women aged 30 and above age-specific fertility rates 
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between 1980 and 2000 decreased by more than 40%, fertility rates among women 
under age 30 declined by only about 25% during this period. In 2000, a woman with an 
average of 2.3 births by her 30th birthday, roughly two-thirds of her lifetime births (El-
Zanaty and Way 2001). These tendencies have implications for future fertility in Egypt. 
If the young cohorts of Egyptian women will continue with delayed fertility, we can 
expect a decline in their Cohort Fertility Rate (CFR). 
The marked decline in fertility in the 1980s (from 6 to 4 children per woman) is 
evident. The TFR stagnated in the 1990s, however, and this development recently has 
been subject to much discussion in the literature (Eltigani, 2003)3. Whereas studies 
based on interpolation techniques have highlighted a continuation in Egyptian fertility 
decline (Fargues 1997, UN 2003, US Census Bureau 2004), a study carried out by El-
Zanaty and Way (2004) has revealed even an increase in Egyptian fertility levels during 
the 1990s. (See also Engelhardt 2004).  
 
 
3. The theoretical framework of Egyptian fertility transition  
The drop in fertility is now significant throughout the Islamic world (Courbage 1995) 
and it has been much faster in North Africa than in the Middle East, probably due to the 
greater exposure of the former region to Western models. The control of fertility in the 
French-speaking Maghreb countries seems to have been closely related to growing 
living standards and to the expansion of education, sice the latter is becoming 
increasingly gender-equal (Mencarini, Salvini, and Vignoli, forethcoming).  
Education seems to remove the differences in fertility between the various 
countries; such differences, which continue to be high only for illiterate women, are still 
perceptible for women with a low to medium level of education, while they are 
negligible for the better-educated. From the first half of the 1990s, the average fertility 
of women with a high school certificate settled at generational replacement levels in all 
Arab countries (Fargues 2000).  
Postponement of marriage is a central aspect that influences fertility levels in 
Muslim countries (such as Egypt). Here, almost all births occur within marriage. 
Marriage and childbearing are viewed as interrelated socio-demographic processes and 
as sequential phases in the female life-cycle. Thus, any increase in the age at first 
marriage constitutes an important demographic event (Eltigani 2000). 
                                                        
3
  Note that period measures such as the Total Fertility Rate used in this text are inevitably influenced by 
cohort developments, e.g. by changes in the mean age at childbearing. A recent study on the role of cohort 
effects in the Egyptian fertility shows that the “quantum” of fertility – as represented through measures 
adjusted for cohort effects – confirms the “stagnation” of fertility in Egypt during the decade 1980-1990 
(Engelhardt 2004). 
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In Egypt, the impact of greater female access to education is significant. Education 
is related to later entry into both married life and childbearing: Girls who have 
completed secondary school are more likely to delay marriage and childbearing, their 
children tend to be healthier, and their participation in the labor force is relatively 
higher (UN 1995). There is a difference of more than five years in the median age at 
first marriage between women who have completed secondary education (23.2 years) 
and those who have never attended school (17.6 years). When they have their first 
child, highly educated women are also on average nearly five years older than women 
who never went to school (El-Zanaty and Way 2004). Thus, female education appears 
to play a major role in the course of fertility, regardless of the socio-economic level 
(see, among others, Castro Martin 1995).  
Urbanization is another central aspect that influences women’s reproductive 
choices: In urban areas, the socio-demographic transition and, more specifically, 
fertility transition is accelerated (Mencarini, Salvini, and Vignoli 2005). It has been 
widely shown that socio-economic structural change, mortality decline, changes in the 
domestic economy, costs associated with birth control, idea diffusion, and the relevance 
of social networks all have an impact that is stronger in urban areas than in rural areas 
(White et al. 2002). In Egypt, the region and the urban-rural type of residence 
(particularly if considered jointly) make for the greatest part of variability in 
contraceptive behavior, as they synthesize many contextual factors related to 
inequalities in the access to the structures of family planning (Giusti and Vignoli 2005, 
2006). 
Reproductive behavior is intimately related to the participation of women in the 
labor force. Many studies use female employment as a proxy for female status, 
expecially regarding access to financial resources, and this despite the fact that working 
women do not necessarily have control over their income. Courbage (1998) states that 
entry into the labor force (even if only at the blue-collar level) has a greater impact on 
fertility than enrolment in primary education. However, once fertility declines 
dramatically, the opportunity costs of children increases for working females, but the 
reproductive process occupies a shorter period of women’s active lives, thereby 
allowing them to increase their participation in the labor force (Reher 2001). 
Another factor that has an effect on a family’s decision to have a child is possibly 
the sex of the child(ren) they already have or desire to have. The sex preference for 
children has been a prominent issue in demographic studies on reproductive behavior 
on developing countries since long time (e.g., Clark 2000, Arnold, Choe, and Roy 
1998). The term son preference is usually used to refer to the attitude that sons are more 
important and more valuable than daughters. Extensive literature documents that in 
countries where the son preference is prevalent there exist a commonly accepted 
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strategy to stop having children – selective birth control4. Practicing selective birth 
control makes for a negative relationship between the proportion of sons and family 
size (Clark 2000). Families who have a preference towards a son are likely to continue 
having children until they reach the desired number of sons (Dalla Zuanna and Leone 
2001). 
Evidence of the son preference is well documented for Egypt regarding fertility 
behavior, including contraceptive use (Arnold 1997). The son preference is often 
institutionalized, in particular in patriarchal societies (such as Egypt): Male progeny is 
wanted as males carry on the family line and the family name. Moreover, sons are often 
thought to enhance the power and prestige of a family. Male are usually favored over 
women owing to economic considerations: they can help out in the family business 
(Arnold 1997).  
 
 
4. Research hypotheses and a first glance at the transition to third 
birth  
For above mentionated reasons, the present study focuses on the third-order fertility. 
Current individual data are analyzed in order to find out whether or not there are 
“pioneer” low fertility subgroups, such as women who have enjoyed higher education 
or who have been brought up in an urban area. If there are such groups, then we expect 
the status of women to have an impact on reproductive behavior, leading to differentials 
in the risks of third childbirth.  
In other words, we are interested in verifying the hypotheses that postponement of 
marriage, an urban background, a higher educational level, and work experience each 
lead to a higher propensity of establishing smaller families. Moreover, we also expect 
the sex preference for children to have an effect on fertility, an effect that differs among 
the subgroups of the population. 
A first glance at the progression to third birth in Egypt confirms the hypotheses 
above, showing significant variations in fertility behavior according to selected socio-
demographic characteristics (Table 1; details on the data used are provided in the next 
paragraph): We observe differential behaviors according to the childhood place of 
residence, the educational level5, the employment status6 before marriage, and the sex 
                                                        
4
 Three mechanisms may affect the sex composition of children ever born: (1) biological factors; (2) sex-
selective abortion, provided the technology is available, (3) selective birth control – couples who have 
attained the desired sex composition of their children are more likely to cede having children. 
5
 Education is included in the analysis on the assumption that women have completed their educational career 
at the time of second birth.  
6
 Note, however, that many of the conventional measures of labour-force participation, obtained from survey 
questions hide a consistent proportion of women engaged in productive activity (Donahoe 1999).  
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composition of children. Women’s education seems to play a key role in impacting the 
timing of third birth. The evidence is provided in Figure 2, which displays the Kaplan-
Meier survival curves for the transition to third birth by education. There is a strong 
similarity between the survival curves for those who have no education and those with 
primary education: Both groups started to reduce their fertility earlier compared to their 
counterparts of secondary and higher education. After the first five years, however, the 
gaps between the three curves start to narrow, although different behaviors by education 
continue to persist.  
To sum up, the simple descriptive outcomes above highlight the complexity of 
the situation studied. The transition to third birth apparently differs markedly among the 
population sub-groups (i.e. differentials related to education, ubanization, and labor-
market participation). 
 
 
Table 1:  Transition from second to third birth, according to some socio- 
 demographic variables. Kaplan Meier survival curve estimates. 
 
Socio-demographic 
variables 
Women never 
having 
experienced 3rd 
birth 5 years into 
the 2nd birth (%) 
Women never 
having 
experienced 3rd 
birth 10 years into 
the 2nd birth (%) 
Duration at which 
25% of women 
experienced third 
childbirth (years) 
Duration at which 
50% of women 
experienced third 
childbirth (years) 
Childhood place of residence    
Rural 17.2 6.4 1.7 2.5 
Urban 40.0 20.8 2.1 3.9 
Women's educational level    
No education 11.6 3.9 1.5 2.2 
Primary  16.2 6.0 1.7 2.5 
Secondary  
     and higher  38.1 18.1 2.3 3.9 
Work experience before marriage    
No 18.1 6.9 1.2 2.6 
Yes 37.4 19.1 2.2 3.7 
Children's sex composition    
Two girls 18.9 6.7 1.7 1.9 
Two boys 20.8 8.4 1.7 2.7 
One boy and  
       one girl 21.9 9.6 1.8 2.7 
  
Source: Own elaborations based on DHS 2000, Egypt.  
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Figure 2: Kaplan-Meier survival curve estimates for the transition from second  
 to third birth according to women’s educational level.  
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Source: Own elaborations based on DHS 2000, Egypt. 
 
 
 
5. Data and model specification  
The descriptive analyses carried out so far do not allow for an evaluation of the role 
played by each explanatory factor (individual or context-related) at the “net” of the 
others. A model thus needs to be constructed, allowing us to investigate the factors that 
influence the progression to third birth in Egypt.  
The data used refers to the Egyptian Demographic and Health Surveys 2000 
(EDHS 2000). Being married is almost universal in Egypt and practically all births 
occur within marital unions. Our analysis therefore focuses on 10,274 currently married 
women aged 15 to 49 who have given second childbirth (excluding twins at second 
birth). The Egyptian Demographic and Health Survey includes a wide range of 
retrospective questions on birth histories and contraceptive use, but most of the 
background characteristics we need were not collected with the individual life histories 
(i.e. information on migration, employment, and the family cycle were obtained only at 
the time of the survey). Hence, it was impossible to examine these variables in 
conjunction with preceding births and to regard them as explanatory variables (Hoem 
1996).  
Some of the basic socio-economic and demographic characteristics of women are 
investigated, using a piecewise constant intensity regression model. Women’s third-
birth risk is defined as the probability of her experiencing third birth within the next 
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month; given her individual characteristics and given that she has not given birth by the 
beginning of the month. The risks are assumed to be constant within each time interval 
but may vary across such intervals. The process time of the model is the number of 
months elapsed from the second to the third birth (starting eight months after the second 
child). 
A time-varying covariate is included in the model specification so as to capture the 
influence of changes in the socio-political environment on third-birth intensity. The 
Egyptian family planning program has been witnessing continued growth ever since its 
introduction. Family planning services were first provided in the 1950s by voluntary 
organizations. Five years later, eight experimental clinics opened to provide services to 
women: Access was restricted, however, requiring written approval from the husband. 
Furthermore, women were eligible only if they had a relatively large family and 
provided evidence that health problems or financial difficulties would arise should 
another child be born (Eltigani 2001). In the 1960s, the clinics multiplied and the 
restrictions were lifted (Fargues 1997). Coinciding with the establishment of the 
Supreme Council of Family Planning, the first planning program was launched in 1965 
(Eltigani 2001). As a successor to the Supreme Council, the National Population 
Council was created 20 years later, to be followed by the creation of the State Ministry 
for Population and Family Welfare in 1993 (Ibrahim 1995). Three years later, the 
Ministry for Population and Family Welfare was abolished and a new Population Sector 
created instead within the Ministry of Health; the latter was renamed the Ministry of 
Health and Population. Recently, non-governmental organizations and private-sector 
services (physicians, pharmacies, private hospitals and clinics) have played an 
important role in the family planning services (Eltigani 2000), this in addition to the 
governmental facilities. To capture the effect of changes in the country’s socio-political 
environment, we include three time periods of equal length in the model (1986-1990, 
1991-1995, 1996 to the date of interview). This also serves the purpose of evaluating 
changes in the country’s family planning policy.  
We construct the following full model of multiplicative main-effects: 
 
srpotnmltkklmnoprs hgfedcbath )()()( = , (1) 
 
where h(t) is the third-birth intensity, which depends on various levels of factors, a 
represents the basic time factor (the number of months elapsed since second childbirth), 
b denotes the age at first marriage, c the length of the previous birth interval, d the 
calendar period, e represents the women’s childhood place of residence, f their 
educational level, g the husband’s educational level, and h the children’s sex 
composition (a variable examining the three possibilities “two girls”, “two boys”, and 
“one boy and one girl”). The variables are grouped into categorical levels, indexed by l, 
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m, o, p, r, and s; k(t), and n(t) denote the intervals in which the baseline hazard and the 
calendar period are kept constant. 
 
 
6. Results and comments  
The model parameters are presented in Table 3 in the form of relative risks, together 
with the p-value in order to evaluate the significance of each covariate’s effect on third 
childbirth.  
Postponement of marriage is associated with lower third-birth intensity: The latter 
diminishes by 34% when comparing women who married before they reached age 20 
with women who married after age 26. The close link between marriage and fertility in 
Egypt is attributable to the fact that in Muslim societies, marriage represents the only 
recognized institution in which childbearing is permitted (Eltigani 2000). However, in 
Egypt the average age at first marriage is still young (by both international and regional 
Mediterranean standards). In this sense, note that the postponement of first marriage has 
made a lesser contribution in the Egyptian fertility transition process than elsewhere in 
the Arab region (e.g. Morocco)7. 
The length of the previous birth interval results in important (and significant) 
control covariate. Short intervals between the first and the second child are associated 
with lower transition rate from second to third birth. 
Controlling for the calendar period, the first period has the highest progression risk 
and then the risk diminishes at each subsequent level. As to the last period, the risk is 
around 27% lower than it is for the pre-1990 period. The decline in third-birth fertility 
is thus evident for the fifteen years preceding the survey (1986-2000). 
 
 
                                                        
7
 Among the older generations (women born in 1960-71) the difference in the union patterns between Egypt 
and Morocco used to be negligible (age at marriage was around 17 years); differently, Egyptian women born 
in 1965–70 marry, on average, at the age of 20, while Moroccan women marry at 23.8 years (Mencarini and 
Salvini 2003).  
Demographic Research: Volume 15, Article 18 
http://www.demographic-research.org 509 
Table 3:  Relative risks (and p-values) of third-birth intensities for two-child  
 mothers, standardized by selected socio-demographic characteristics,  
 Egypt 2000. 
 
Covariates Relative Risks p-value 
Age at marriage   
Less than 19 years 1.00 - 
20-22 years 0.86 0.000 
23-25 years 0.78 0.000 
More than 26 years 0.66 0.000 
Previous birth interval   
Less than 2 years 1.00 - 
2 years and more 0.56 0.000 
Calendar period   
1986-1990 1.00 - 
1991-1995 0.75 0.000 
1996-2000 0.73 0.000 
Woman’s childhood place of residence   
Rural 1.00 - 
Urban 0.72 0.000 
Woman’s educational level   
No education 1.00 - 
Primary  0.86 0.001 
Secondary and higher  0.65 0.000 
Work experience before marriage   
No Work experience 1.00 - 
Work experience 0.93 0.070 
Sex composition of previous children   
Two girls 1.00 - 
Two boys 0.95 0.005 
One boy and one girl 0.93 0.035 
Duration since second birth    
< 1.5 years 1.00 - 
1.5 – 2.49 years 3.35 0.000 
2.5 – 3.99 years  3.99 0.000 
4 – 5.99 years 3.21 0.000 
6 – 18.5 years 1.60 0.000 
 
Source: Own elaborations based on DHS 2000, Egypt.  
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As expected, the educational composition of the population, work experience 
before marriage, and the childhood place of residence all are important predictors of 
fertility change: Women with a lower level of education, those with no work experience 
preceding marriage and those who were brought up in a rural context experience a 
higher transition rate from the second to the third child. It thus emerges that in Egypt 
the diffusion of urban-type norms make crowded and complex household types less 
feasible to maintain8. Increasing educational standards, postponement of marriage, and 
rising proportions of women involved in economic activity all are aspects that are 
significantly changing women’s reproductive choices. The experience of employment 
and a higher level of educational attainment enable them to be less dependent on their 
husbands and on extended family members. It follows that a greater degree of female 
independence decreases third-birth intensity (Yavuz 2005). 
Looking at the sex composition of the previous children, we can see lower 
transition rate for couples who have “two boys” (i.e., a hazard which is lower by 5%) 
and for couples who have “one boy and one girl” (i.e., a hazard which is lower by 7%), 
in comparison with the reference category “two girls”. These findings provide evidence 
for a moderate presence of the sex preference in Egypt9. Reproductive behavior is thus 
consistent with families’ desire to have “at least one boy” to maintain the ancestral line, 
but no special desire for many boys is apparent. 
In order to catch the process of fertility decline according to women’s educational 
level, an interaction model is fitted between the calendar period and educational 
attainment (Table 4). The results reveal a general decrease in third-birth intensity over 
time at each educational level; this means that also women with a low level of 
education experienced a fertility decline during the 1990s. Another interesting aspect 
when comparing the last examined period (1996-2000) with the previous one (1991-
1995), is the stagnation in the decline of third-order fertility for the better-educated 
women. This finding possibly contributes to explain the recent leveling off of Egyptian 
aggregate fertility. This result is in line with a recent work by Eltigani (2003). Using 
data collected by the 1988, 1992, 1995, and the 2000 Egyptian Demographic and Health 
Survey, the author states that the reproductive behavior of women from high and middle 
standard households is largely responsible for the stalling of the fertility decline during 
recent years.  
                                                        
8
 Note, however, that the effect of modernisation in each specified area is not merely the weighted sum of the 
effect of relatively modernized women in that area: Women’s choices are also significantly influenced by the 
specific context of residence (Giusti and Vignoli 2005, 2006), the latter which is influenced by the cultural 
norms of the community and by the particular opportunities that the area of residence has to offer. 
9
 Analysis of the impact of the sex combination of previous children on all birth order until parity seven  has 
been carried out so. In general, instead of a preference of sons over daughters, it emerges a preference for a 
gender equilibrium within the family. Details of these analyses - available from the author by request - are not 
reported in the text being the progression to third child the key parity-transition also for this issue. 
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A second interaction involves the calendar period and work experience preceding 
marriage (Table 5). The results show a decline in third birth intensity over time both for 
women with and without work experience before marriage. As for the previous 
interaction, even the latter groups show a drop in fertility during the last five years of 
the1990s. 
Thus, the outcomes of the interaction between the calendar period and women’s 
education and between the calendar period and women’s work experience preceding 
marriage (Tables 4-5) do not support the main arguments generally presented in the 
demographic transition theory. Namely the changes are not concentrates in some socio-
economic strata, but all the segments of the population are changing their reproductive 
behavior. We found that dynamic process of modernization in the country impacts even 
the fertility behavior of the most laggard groups of women, highlighting the process of 
emancipation from the traditional role of wife and mother. 
The effect of educational attainment is also seen in the interaction between the sex 
composition of the children and the level of the mother’s education (Table 6). Women 
with no education probably do not use contraception very much, and so they are unable 
to control their fertility. Although they may well prefer boys to girls, it does not matter 
what their sex preferences are since they cannot realize them. Hence the sex 
composition of their existing children has no effect on their future fertility.  
The less educated portion of the population (with primary level of education) 
consists in women who probably use birth control and have a sex preference: When 
they have reached the desired sex composition, they are more likely to cede 
childbearing than those who have not yet done so.  
Furthermore, the influence of the son preference tends to wane when looking at 
women who have completed secondary or higher education. This result underlines the 
important role that education plays in fertility: it removes selective birth control when it 
comes to the sex composition of the children. 
 
Table 4:  Relative risks (and p-values) of third-birth intensities for two-child  
 mothers, by interaction between calendar period and women’s  
 educational level, Egypt 2000. 
 
Calendar period 
 
Women's education level 1985-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 
No education 1.00 0.72 (0.000) 0.68 (0.000) 
Primary  0.86 (0.000) 0.65 (0.000) 0.55 (0.000) 
Secondary and higher  0.58 (0.000) 0.49 (0.000) 0.50 (0.000) 
Source: Own elaborations based on DHS 2000, Egypt. LR> )95.0(24χ  
Note: The interaction is controlled for all the other factors presented in Table 3. 
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Table 5:  Relative risks (and p-values) of third-birth intensities for two-child  
 mothers, by interaction between calendar period and women’s work  
 experience before marriage , Egypt 2000. 
 
 Calendar period 
Work before marriage 1985-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 
No Work experience 1.00 0.95 (0.000) 0.86 (0.000) 
Work experience 0.91 (0.079) 0.82 (0.006) 0.76 (0.000) 
Source: Own elaborations based on DHS 2000, Egypt. LR> )95.0(22χ  
Note: The interaction is controlled for all the other factors presented in Table 3. 
 
 
 
Table 6:  Relative risks (and p-values) of third-birth intensities for two-child  
 mothers, by interaction between women’s educational level and sex  
 composition of previous children, Egypt 2000. 
 
 Women's educational level 
Sex composition of previous 
children No education Primary  Secondary and higher  
Two girls 1.00 0.87 (0.056) 0.64 (0.000) 
Two boys 0.95 (0.188) 0.72 (0.000) 0.62 (0.000) 
One girl and one boy 0.93 (0.257) 0.71 (0.002) 0.61 (0.000) 
Source: Own elaborations based on DHS 2000, Egypt. LR> )95.0(22χ  
Note: The interaction is controlled for all the other factors presented in Table 3. 
 
 
 
7. Discussion  
Today, almost all countries of the South-East Mediterranean Region witness fertility 
transition. The widening of educational opportunities and urbanization is influencing 
reproductive behavior. Despite the limited presence of women in the labor market, an 
irreversible drop in fertility seems to prefigure considerable social transformations (the 
erosion of the patriarchal system and the modification of the societal status of women) 
(Fargues 2000, 2003).  
Egypt of the last decade, notwithstanding its advanced stage of socio-demographic 
transition, has shown near stagnation in the reduction of fertility levels. This study 
analyzed the impact of some socio-demographic characteristics of Egyptian women on 
the propensity of third childbirth in Egypt. The findings show that the differences 
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among the social groups continue to persist: Women with a lower educational level, a 
rural background, and women with no work experience preceding marriage display 
higher risks of third childbirth. The study also reveals that the preference for at least one 
son in the family on the progression to the third child is weakening among women who 
have completed secondary education.  
The following question arises: What can we expect in terms of future Egyptian 
fertility? Stagnation in the decline of third-order fertility is observed among women 
who have completed secondary education. The difficult change in the fertility of 
women with high educational standards seems thus to be responsible for the stalling 
fertility decline during recent years. The analysis, however, has demonstrated that 
within the framework of the ongoing process of modernization in the country, even the 
most laggard groups of women showed a decrease in third-birth intensity during the 
1990s. Thus, because women who had no schooling, who lived in rural areas and who 
had no work experience still represent a sizable proportion of the Egyptian population, 
we can expect a further decline in the number of large families in the near future.  
As to the aggregate level of fertility, decreasing fertility will continue, if only as a 
result of the continuing trend towards greater education, urbanization, and work among 
women. According to the demographic forecasts made by Courbage (2002) for Egypt, 
the proportion of educated women is expected to grow in the short run and this fact in 
itself will continue to mean an increase in the average age at marriage and at first birth, 
and therefore also a decline of the period fertility rate. What the quantum of fertility 
will be in the long run when the rise of timing indicators ends is, of course, impossible 
to say.  
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